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The State of California grows nearly all the avocados produced in the United States.
Despite the state’s size, California’s avocado industry satisfies only 10% of the country’s
demand for the fruit. To meet the remaining 90%, CNN Business reports that the United States
imports avocados from Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.1 Now, imagine the California
legislature has passed a statute prohibiting Californians from consuming avocados that were not
cultivated , processed, and packaged in as well as distributed from California. The expected
initial response would be one of outrage and wonder as to how such a statute could be
constitutional. Albeit fiction, this scenario accurately depicts existing legal restraints on the
consumption of cannabis as it relates to the plant’s transportability across state lines. The
marijuana scheduling under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), as well as state cannabis
legalization statutes and regulations, prohibit the transportation of marijuana across state lines
This Article contends that these laws and regulations, which are creatures of federal supremacy
and state protectionism, stifle the growth potential of the cannabis industry in the United States.

INTRODUCTION
Despite recent efforts to legalize recreational cannabis use on the federal level, 2 the
federal government has largely relinquished control of the issue to the states. 3 Existing legal
restraints on the transportation of cannabis the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), as

1 Jackie Wattles, Guess Where All Those Avocados Come From, CNN B USINESS (Jan. 27, 2017),

https://money.cnn.com/2017/01/27/news/economy/avocados-trump-mexico/index.html [https://perma.cc/DNV5NLAE].
2 See, e.g., MORE Act, H.R.3617, 117th Cong. (2022), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th -congress/housebill/3617 [https://perma.cc/HC2E-FP5Z].
3 See Staff of H. Rules Comm. 113th Cong., Text of House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 213 -14
(2014) (“[n]one of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used [...] to prevent [...]
States from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of
medical marijuana”).
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well as various state laws and regulations, limit the potential for natural growth of the cannabis
industry supply chain. The cannabis supply chain is made up of five key stages: cultivation,
manufacturing, distribution, transportation, and retail. While this paper focuses on the existing
legal restraints as applied to the transportation stage of the cannabis supply chain, it also
discusses the effect of those restraints on the cannabis supply chain as a whole.
This paper proceeds in six parts. Part I provides an explanation of the term “supply
chain,” an overview of the existing cannabis supply chain, and additional information as to the
activities that take place during each stage of the supply chain. Part II outlines the existing legal
restraints, both federal and state, that stifle the cannabis industry’s potential for domestic and
national growth. Part III examines the impact of those legal restraints on the cannabis industry’s
supply chain and growth. Part IV details proposed solutions, while Part V analyzes potential
roadblocks and/or issues that may result from Part IV’s proposals. Part VI concludes this paper
by analyzing the cannabis industry’s potential for growth and examining how current legal
restraints impact aspects of the cannabis industry beyond transportation.
I.

FROM SEED TO SALE: THE CANNABIS SUPPLY CHAIN
A. What is the Supply Chain?
In our post-pandemic world, news outlets are rife with articles concerned about global

“supply chain” disruptions and their impacts.4 For example, the recent shortage of computer
chips has negatively impacted manufacturers including major industry players such as Tesla and
Whirlpool.5 As a result, many find themselves seeking deeper understanding about the supply
chain, and why it matters in the larger context of global commerce. A supply chain is a network

4 E.g., Will Knight, The Supply Chain Crisis Is About to Get a Lot Worse, WIRED (Mar. 28, 2022),

https://www.wired.com/story/supply-chain-crisis-data/ [https://perma.cc/VSM7-3ZT6].
5 Peter Goodman, A Normal Supply Chain? It’s ‘Unlikely’ in 2022., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/business/supply-chain-disruption.html [https://perma.cc/2HQM-8PV4].
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consisting of a series of steps between a company and its suppliers. 6 This network outlines the
process of producing consumer goods from inception to consumption, connecting raw material
suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and consumers in a horizontal progression. Every
item you have ever purchased, from the shoes on your feet to the car you drive, has ridden the
long highway known as the supply chain.7
All tangible goods begin their lives as nothing more than a set of raw materials, procured
from different sources. For example, a pair of leather shoes begins its supply chain journey as a
length of animal hide or leather to create the shoe’s body, unprocessed rubber to make the shoe’s
outsoles, and cord or fabric to become the shoe’s laces. Through the placement of specialized
actors in the supply chain such as manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, raw materials
transform from distinct, separate building blocks into a single, consumable good. Without raw
materials, manufacturers would be unable to produce the finished goods that would eventually
make their way into consumers’ hands. The importance of an adequate supply of raw materials is
increasingly felt in today’s construction industry, which is experiencing the largest raw materials
shortage in fifteen years, affecting the basic building blocks for any construction project
including lumber and steel.8 Raw material shortages have a direct impact on market pricing,
specifically because demand outpaces supply, causing exponential increases in average costs. 9

6 Will Kenton, Supply Chain, I NVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 29, 2021),

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp [https://perma.cc/CD56-243A].
7 Note that the supply chain does not only facilitate the creation of finished goods but can also apply to services such
as after-sales support for products including warranties, parts, and maintenance.
8 Abe Eshkenazi, Supply Chains Encounter a Global Raw Materials Crisis, ASS’N FOR SUPPLY C HAIN M GMT . (Apr.
30, 2021), https://www.ascm.org/ascm -insights/scm-now-impact/supply-chains-encounter-a-global-raw-materialscrisis/ [https://perma.cc/UG78-9S8K].
9 Abe Eshkenazi, The Best-Laid House Plans . . . , ASS’N FOR SUPPLY C HAIN M GMT . (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.ascm.org/ascm-insights/scm-now-impact/the-best-laid-house-plans-/ [https://perma.cc/F8L2-9EM8].
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Once raw materials are procured, they must be transformed into a tangible, singular good,
and this is when manufacturers come into play. Manufacturers are responsible for creating goods
for distribution and sale.10 After the manufacturer has combined the raw materials to create a
finished product, a wholesaler will typically purchase the finished goods in bulk and store those
goods in a proprietary or third-party warehouse.11 Wholesalers are then responsible for
connecting with retailers who act either as the online or brick-and-mortar locales where
consumers can purchase the finished goods.12 Wholesalers typically sell the finished goods at a
specified price, which usually consists of their costs plus a predetermined markup percentage. 13
Retailers similarly determine the price of the goods they offer for sale to the everyday
consumer.14
B. The Road to Cannabis Consumption
Consumable cannabis in all forms begins as the plant Cannabis sativa L. and follows the
typical supply chain cycle of many consumer goods. There are a myriad of factors specific to
growing plants, however, that must be considered in the production of consumable cannabis
including hydration, light, and harvesting methods.15
The production of consumable cannabis begins at the cultivation stage. Like any plant,
cannabis has its own set of specific cultivation needs ranging from the amount of water supplied

10 Manufacturing a Product in a Supply Chain, ELMHURST UNIV. (Mar. 29, 2022),

https://www.elmhurst.edu/blog/manufacturing-a-product/ [https://perma.cc/EK67-C9YH].
11 Id.
12 Wholesale’s Role in the Supply Chain, CLEANLINK (Mar. 29, 2022),
https://www.cleanlink.com/cleanlinkminute/details.aspx?id=27441 [https://perma.cc/T98U-RYXH]
13 E.g., Alexis Damen, Product Pricing: How to Set Prices for Wholesale and Retail, SHOPIFY R ETAIL BLOG (Mar.
16, 2022), https://www.shopify.com/retail/product-pricing-for-wholesale-and-retail [https://perma.cc/766B-P5SN].
14 Id.
15 Gibson Lannister, Harvesting Cannabis for Maximum Strength and Quality, M AXIMUM YIELD (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://www.maximumyield.com/harvesting-cannabis-for-maximum-strength-and-quality/2/17480
[https://perma.cc/7R4H-FFMK].
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to the plants to the temperature of the growth environment to the amount of light to which the
plants are exposed within that environment. 16 Cannabis next proceeds to the manufacturing
stage, where, prior to being extracted into a myriad of by-products, the harvest must undergo
testing at a state-accredited laboratory to ensure alignment with established safety and potency
standards.17 Once the harvest completes the manufacturing stage, the product must be distributed
for retail sales via the transportation portion of the supply chain.
Due to the legal status of cannabis, transportation of finished cannabis goods presents a
myriad of difficulties around which suppliers must navigate. 18 Because cannabis remains illegal
under federal law, the interstate movement of cannabis is federally prohibited under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which states that, “[e]xcept as authorized by this title, it shall
be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally [...] to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”19
CSA challengers have been unsuccessful in their claims that the statute specifically defines
“marijuana” as Cannabis sativa L., and, therefore, that congressional intent was to prohibit only
one species of cannabis.20 Moreover and despite legalization of recreational cannabis on a state
level, some states impose restrictions on exactly who may transport cannabis from manufacturer
to retailer, requiring special distribution licenses granted by state regulatory authorities.21

16 Id.
17 Marcy Greenfield, Time to Understand the Cannabis Supply Chain, B ERDON LLP (Aug. 16, 2021),

https://www.berdonllp.com/time-to-understand-the-cannabis-supply-chain/ [https://perma.cc/ARY3-NZEH].
18 Kelly Vo, Cannabis Transportation: The Challenges of Getting Product from Point A to Point B , DOPE M AG.
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://dopemagazine.com/cannabis-transportation/ [https://perma.cc/7S2G-SF32].
19 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841.
20 United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d 201, 204 (D.C. 1975) (holding that Congress “believed it was outlawing all
marijuana which contained THC” in enacting the CSA).
21 See, e.g., N.J. STAT . ANN. § 24:6I-31 et seq. (2021) (defining “cannabis distributor” based on licensure with a
Class 4 Cannabis Distributor license authorizing intrastate bulk transportation of cannabis).
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If a cannabis distributor manages to make it to the other end of the transportation maze,
the finished product is delivered to retail establishments for sale to consumers. Retail sale of
recreational cannabis, however, comes with its own restrictions, which dictate where and to
whom the cannabis may be sold.22 The plethora of restrictions on recreational cannabis at most
stages of the supply chain indicate that the cannabis supply chain cannot achieve sustainable,
long-term growth without either federal legalization or state reforms or both. The next section of
this paper details where these restrictions come from and who is to blame—the federal
government or the state—for the current state of affairs.
II.

FORMING THE BORDERS: LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON CANNABIS TRANSPORTATION

Traditional wisdom attributes the restrictive nature of cannabis transportation to the
federal prohibition of marijuana under the CSA. While correct in part, this wisdom overstates the
case because “neither federal law nor federal law enforcement policy treats state-authorized
cannabis commerce differently just because the activity crosses state lines, i.e., just because it is
interstate.”23 Some posit that state legalization statutes that limit cannabis commerce to intrastate
actors do so “to minimize the potential for scrutiny from the federal government and criminal
penalties stemming from discrepancies between state and federal laws.” 24 Commentators also
claim that federal prohibition gives states “free rein to discriminate against outsiders in their
local cannabis markets.”25 As explained below, existing legal restraints on interstate cannabis
transportation are an amalgamation of both federal and state initiatives to both prevent cannabis
from crossing state borders as well as keep all cannabis-related business intrastate.

22 Greenfield, supra note 17.
23 Robert Mikos, Symposium: Interstate Commerce in Cannabis, 101 B.U.L. REV. 857, 860 (2021).
24 Geoff Korff, The Quagmire of Marijuana Interstate Commerce, MJB IZDAILY (Aug. 24, 2021),

https://mjbizdaily.com/the-pros-and-cons-of-marijuana-interstate-commerce/ (updated Mar. 9, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/7WG4-8MM9].
25 Id. at 858.
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A. The Constitution and the Controlled Substances Act: Federal Restrictions
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution states that Congress shall
have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . .
.”26 The Commerce Clause is an affirmative grant of power authorizing Congress to regulate
activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce. 27 The Supreme Court has held that the
purpose of the Commerce Clause is to ensure that those who wish to participate in the national
economy “will have free access to every market in the Nation.” 28 The CSA’s prohibition of
cannabis, however, has created a barrier to market access for those who wish to participate in the
cannabis industry.
As stated previously, the CSA prohibits the manufacture, distribution, transport, and sale
of cannabis.29 As a result, cannabis finds itself in a legal gray area by virtue of federal
prohibition and state legalization. The CSA classifies controlled substances that fall under its
purview by assigning them to one of five schedules. 30 The statute outlines various factors that the
Attorney General must consider when either scheduling or de-scheduling a particular substance,
including:
1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse; 2) Scientific evidence of
its pharmacological effect, if known; 3) The state of current
scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance; 4) Its
history and current pattern of abuse; 5) The scope, duration, and
significance of abuse; 6) What, if any, risk there is to public health;
7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability; [and] 9)
26 U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that an activity does not need to have a direct effect on

interstate commerce to fall within the commerce power as long as its effect is “substantial and economic” in nature);
see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (recognizing broader grounds upon which the
Commerce Clause can be used to regulate state activity, holding that an activity is considered “commerce” if it has a
“substantial economic effect” on interstate commerce or if the “cumulative effect” of an act could have an effect on
commerce).
28 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 366 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
29 21 U.S.C. § 841.
30 Id. § 811.
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Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance
already controlled under this title.31
Cannabis is assigned to CSA Schedule I, a designation reserved for substances that meet three
criteria: 1) they have a high potential for abuse; 2) no currently accepted medical use in
treatment; and 3) there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the substance under medical
supervision.32 Other CSA Schedule I substances include heroin, psilocybin, 33 lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD), and peyote.34 Opioid painkillers such as oxycodone and hydrocodone, as
well as cocaine and methamphetamines, are Schedule II drugs due to their high potential for
abuse, but with the caveat that they have a recognized, currently accepted medical use in
treatment.35 The scheduling dichotomy between the publicly-perceived low-risk cannabis and
high-risk cocaine or methamphetamine has generated confusion as to cannabis’ Schedule I
placement.36
While previous Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance on marijuana enforcement (“Cole
Memo”) removed cannabis enforcement from federal priorities,37 former Attorney General Jeff
Sessions (“Sessions Memo”) rescinded those policies. 38 The Cole Memo refocused DOJ
enforcement efforts to prevent sale to minors, organized crime, and illegal interstate movement

31 Id. § 811(c).
32 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(23) (listing marijuana among Schedule I

“[h]allucinogenic substances”).
33 Psilocybin is the active ingredient in hallucinogenic mushrooms. U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., PSILOCYBIN DRUG
FACT SHEET, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/Psilocybin-2020_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4FJHCY3].
34 21 U.S.C. § 812.
35 Id. at § 812(b)(2).
36 German Lopez, The Federal Drug Scheduling System, Explained, VOX (Aug. 11, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/drug-schedule-list-marijuana [https://perma.cc/P5FF-EGV8].
37 Press Release, U.S. DEPT . OF JUST ., Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/LFZ7 -CXMY].
38 Press Release, U.S. DEPT . OF JUST ., Marijuana Enforcement 1.4.18 (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/8FSU-Z76V].
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of marijuana whereas the Sessions Memo reversed course and instructed federal prosecutors and
agencies to consider “the seriousness of the crime, the deterrent effects of criminal prosecution,
and the cumulative impact of particular crimes on the community.” 39
B. State Legalization Statutes: A Potential Dormant Commerce Clause Conflict
States have undoubtedly led the way on recreational cannabis legalization in the United
States. As of January 2022, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have legalized
recreational cannabis, with more expected to follow suit as the year progresses. 40 Despite the
public consensus that states have triumphed where the federal government could not, a closer
look at state legalization statutes reveals self-imposed restrictive regimes under which states
ensure that all aspects of the cannabis supply chain, from cultivation to retail, are limited to
intrastate operation.
This hyper-localization of the cannabis supply chain prohibits the import and export of
cannabis, leaving both producers and consumers to operate within the confines of state borders.
Those who wish to enter the retail cannabis business and follow the traditional path to
commercial growth would have to, at significant capital expense, invest in brick-and-mortar
facilities for each segment of the cannabis supply chain in each state they wish to operate.
Professor Robert Mikos notes that states likely impose these restrictions to protect their
respective local cannabis industries and to enjoy the economic benefits that result from locking
out out-of-state competition.41 These restrictions, however, inhibit the growth of both small
businesses and multistate operators who are licensed in multiple states with subsidiaries in those

39 Id.
40 Claire Hansen et. al., Where is Marijuana Legal? A Guide to Marijuana Legalization , U.S. NEWS & WORLD R EP.

(Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/where-is-marijuana -legal-a-guide-to-marijuanalegalization.
41 Mikos, supra note 23, at 860.
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states by requiring them to operate separate facilities in each state.42 Mikos goes on to argue that
“instead of limiting the flow of cannabis across state lines . . . these laws limit the flow of capital
across state lines,” preventing intrastate investment from out-of-state actors and actually hurting
the state’s economic interests in the end.43
Colorado became the first state to legalize recreational marijuana in 2012 after voters
approved Amendment 64 to the Colorado Constitution, which authorized the personal use,
possession, and limited home-grow of marijuana for adults at least twenty-one years of age.44
Despite legalization, Colorado restricts the interstate movement of cannabis, specifically stating
that “[a] Delivery Motor Vehicle must not leave the State of Colorado while any amount of
Regulated Marijuana is in the Delivery Motor Vehicle.”45
In 2015, Oregon made news by becoming the second state in the country to legalize
recreational cannabis use. Similar to Colorado, Oregon’s legalization statute includes an
interstate restriction, which provides that “[a] person may not import marijuana items into this
state or export marijuana items from this state.”46 These restrictions also carry with them
sanctions of up to five years’ imprisonment for violations. 47 Even California, which is widely
regarded as one of the most liberal state jurisdictions in the country, restricts the transport of
cannabis across state lines, stating that “[a] delivery employee shall not leave the State of
California while possessing cannabis goods.”48

42 Id. at 863.
43 Id.
44 COLO. C ONST . art. XVIII, sec. 16 (2020).
45 COLO. C ODE REGS. § 212-3:3-615(E)(8).
46 OR. REV. STAT . ANN. § 475B.227.
47 Id. at § 475B.277(3)-(4) (specifying grades of offenses).
48 CAL. CODE R EGS. tit. 16, § 5416(b).
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While bans on the import and export of cannabis are ubiquitous in state legalization
statutes, some states have gone further and imposed residency requirements as a barrier to
participate in their respective cannabis markets. In addition to restrictions placed on transporting
cannabis, even out-of-staters who seek to operate within state lines have been met with resistance
by state-imposed residency requirements, both durational and non-durational. While these stateimposed restrictions on cannabis have not been addressed by the Supreme Court, non-cannabis
precedent teaches that state laws which discriminate against out-of-state residents are virtually
per se invalid.49
In 2016, Maine voters approved a ballot referendum to legalize recreational cannabis. 50
In response, the Maine legislature passed the Marijuana Legalization Act (MLA), establishing
the regulatory framework that would facilitate legalization. 51 Despite its similar structure to most
other legalization statutes authorizing recreational cannabis, Maine’s MLA included a
requirement that applicants for recreational cannabis retailer licenses must either be a resident of
the state, or, if the applicant is a corporation, that all corporate officers be Maine residents. 52
In 2020, Wellness Connection, an applicant for an adult-use retail cannabis license,
brought suit against the city of Portland, Maine, contending that the city’s licensure ordinance
was unconstitutional.53 Wellness Connection was a wholly-owned Delaware corporation and
nearly all of its officers were non-Maine residents.54 In its challenge, Wellness Connection
asserted that the ordinance’s residency criteria “create[d] an unconstitutional preference for

49 E.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (“State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce

face ‘a virtually per se rule of invalidity.’” (quoting City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978))).
50 Maine Results, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/maine
[https://perma.cc/G5HC-U3XF].
51 M E. REV. STAT .. tit. 28-B, § 101 (2021).
52 Id. at § 202(2).
53 NPG, LLC v. City of Portland, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146958 (D. Me. Aug. 14, 2020).
54 Id. at 7.
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Maine residents” in direct contravention of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 55 The Dormant
Commerce Clause, while not specifically enumerated as a congressional power in the
Constitution, prevents states from enacting protectionist legislation designed to benefit its own
economic interests to the detriment of non-residents.56 Wellness Connection ultimately prevailed
in obtaining a preliminary injunction against the ordinance. The court held that ordinance’s
residency provisions unfairly discrimination against non-resident applicants in violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause (DCC).57
In 2021, the City of Detroit enacted an ordinance that gave preferential treatment to
“longtime” city residents in its cannabis licensure application process. 58 The City defined
“longtime” residents as individuals who had lived in the city for at least fifteen of the prior thirty
years, or who met certain other conditions and lived in the city for at least ten years. 59 The City
extended to these “legacy” applicants an exclusive six-week early application window and
reserved to them at least fifty percent of its adult-use cannabis retail licenses. A Detroit resident,
who did not meet the legacy conditions, challenged the ordinance, arguing that the conditions
were per se invalid under the DCC for being facially discriminatory. 60 Despite the City’s
arguments that there was technically no interstate market for its ordinance to burden under the
DCC, the Eastern District of Michigan held that the ordinance showed “facial favoritism toward

55 Id. at 19.
56 See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-274 (1988); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S.

328, 337-338 (2008).
57 Id. (quoting Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007)).
58 Gus Burns, After Failed First Attempt, Detroit Takes Second Shot at Recreational Marijuana , MLIVE (Apr. 6,
2022), https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/2022/04/after-failed-first-attempt-detroit-takes-second-shot-atrecreational-marijuana.html [https://perma.cc/2N5F-TLRQ].
59 Id.
60 Lowe v. City of Detroit, 544 F. Supp. 3d 804 (E.D. Mich. 2021).
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Detroit residents of at least 10-15 years” and that favoritism “embodies precisely the sort of
economic protectionism that the Supreme Court has long prohibited.” 61
Missouri also saw a challenge to its residency requirements where a nonresident minority
owner of a licensed Missouri cannabis dispensary wished to purchase a majority stake in the
business. Missouri’s Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) issued regulations
conditioning the approval of a cannabis license on a business owner proof that the business is
majority-owned by a Missouri resident of at least one year. 62 The nonresident plaintiff argued
that the durational residency requirement violated the DCC, and surprisingly, the state did not
dispute the facially discriminatory nature of the requirement. Instead, it argued that the
requirement facilitated a faster and easier method for the state to conduct background checks on
in-state residents.63 The district court held that the durational residency requirement was per se
invalid and that the state’s justification was not narrowly tailored given the available
nondiscriminatory alternatives.64
Part IIA of this Essay outlined the source of congressional cannabis oversight through the
Commerce Clause, which vests Congress with the power to legislate and regulate all activities
with a substantial effect on commerce. While not explicit in the Constitution, the Dormant
Commerce Clause (DCC) exists as a negative imposition on the states as a counterpart to the
positive grant of the Commerce Clause power. Specifically, the DCC prohibits states from
passing legislation that “discriminates against or excessively burdens interstate commerce.” 65 In
so prohibiting, the DCC seeks to foster and promote the development of a national market and

61 Id. at 816.
62 Toigo v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 549 F. Supp. 3d 985, 988 (W.D. Mo. 2021).
63 Id. at 991.
64 Id. at 993.
65 Commerce Clause, CORNELL LEGAL I NFO. I NST., (Mar. 29, 2022),

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause [https://perma.cc/QFP6 -8SAW].
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the free flow of goods, services, and capital across state borders. 66 Only through congressional
authorization may a state purposely discriminate against interstate commerce, since the
Commerce Clause vests the power to regulate said commerce with Congress. 67
The state legalization statutes reviewed in this part appear to be directly inapposite to the
DCC’s prohibitions against discrimination by one state of another state’s citizens in commerce.
States often look to the federal marijuana ban as an excuse for imposing interstate restrictions on
cannabis. Specifically, states have claimed that: 1) they must bar interstate commerce in cannabis
to appease the federal government; or, in the alternative, 2) Congress has implicitly overridden
the DCC’s anti-protectionism default rules and authorized them to discriminate against interstate
commerce in cannabis by banning marijuana.68 States seemingly fail to recognize, however, that
as it relates to all other types of consumer goods, the prohibitions on the interstate sale of
cannabis are likely unconstitutional under the DCC. 69
While federal cannabis legalization does not appear likely in 2022, should Congress
adopt reforms to legalize cannabis, the DCC would likely force legalization states to open their
borders to the import and export of cannabis, as well as to remove any barriers to nonresidents

66 Mikos, supra note 18.
67 E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“It is well established that Congress may authorize States to

engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid.”).
68 Id. at 861.
69 Id.

14

establishing cannabis businesses within the state’s borders. Should nonresidents decide to
challenge state residency requirements for cannabis licensure, precedent is in their corner. 70
III.

IMPACT OF RESTRICTIONS ON INTERSTATE CANNABIS COMMERCE
A. Too Little or Too Much: Overregulation and Supply

A key indicator of supply chain efficiency is whether it facilitates the careful balance of
supply and demand that ensures adequate product for consumption. The cannabis industry is one
of the most highly regulated in the United States next to finance and healthcare.71 As it relates to
product supply and demand, the more regulated an industry is, the more likely it is to experience
supply chain issues.72
Over regulation—and by extension over restriction—of the cannabis industry has led to
issues of both oversupply and undersupply in many states that have either recently legalized
recreational cannabis or have had legalization statutes in place for a few years. New Jersey
legalized recreational cannabis in February 2021 by passing the Cannabis Regulatory,
Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMM), 73 but nearly a year
post-legalization, the state’s Cannabis Regulatory Commission (CRC) announced that it faces a
shortage of over 100,000 pounds of cannabis to adequately supply both medical and recreational
cannabis consumers.74 Although New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy recently announced that the

70 NPG, LLC v. City of Portland, supra note 53.
71 Benjamin M. Adams, A Majority of Companies in Tightly-Regulated Industries Say Compliance is Biggest
Barrier, H IGH TIMES (Sep. 21, 2021), https://hightimes.com/news/a -majority-of-companies-in-tightly-regulated-

industries-say-compliance-is-biggest-barrier/ [https://perma.cc/D2DX-MVHF].
72 OpenStax, Principles of Microeconomics, OPENSTAX CNX (Apr. 14, 2015), http://cnx.org/contents/ea2f225e6063-41ca -bcd8-36482e15ef65@10.31 [https://perma.cc/QQ9J-YNG6].
73 N.J. STAT . ANN. § 24:6I-31.
74 Suzette Parmley, N.J. Legal Weed Market Delay is ‘Totally Unacceptable,’ and Top Lawmaker Demands
Answers, NJ.COM (Mar. 29, 2022), https://www.nj.com/marijuana/2022/03/top -democrat-orders-probe-intounacceptable-delay-in-launching-nj-legal-weed-market.html [https://perma.cc/35JL-7WPA].
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state’s adult-use market’s launch was “a matter of weeks, not months” away, the CRC does not
expect to begin recreational cannabis sales until 2023 at the earliest. 75
On the other hand, some cannabis growers in New Jersey are experiencing an oversupply
of legal cannabis, largely due to the state’s delays in getting the adult-use market up and running.
Operators at two major alternative treatment centers (ATC) in New Jersey, Verano and Curaleaf,
voiced concerns about having to destroy cultivated cannabis grown in anticipation of the adult use market going live due to the product’s limited shelf life of six months. Cannabis cultivators
in New Jersey began to ramp up production after the CREAMM Act was signed into law in
February 2021, but over a year later the market is still not live, leading to an oversupply of
product. Despite the CREAMM Act providing that the adult-use market could open six months
after the CRC adopted regulations for the industry—making the presumed market launch land
somewhere around February 2022—cultivators are finding that the CRC is dragging its heels on
license approvals. While the CRC claims that these cultivators have yet to comply with the Act’s
stipulations, including municipal approval, relevant necessary supply to serve their patient base,
and operational capacity to continue to serve and expand access, cultivators like Verano claim
that they are still waiting on approvals for applications submitted prior to January 2022.
New Jersey is not the only state that is experiencing, or has experienced, supply problems
because of overregulation. In 2019, Michigan faced a medical marijuana shortage because of
newly imposed regulations that required medical cannabis dispensaries to obtain cannabis solely
from licensed commercial growers.76 The state failed to realize, however, that it did not have
enough growers and processors to meet the existing medical cannabis demand even prior to the
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regulations taking effect. As a result, Michigan’s governor had to request that the state’s medical
marijuana regulatory board allow dispensaries with temporary licenses to reopen with supply
from caregivers, the network of growers who had been supplying Michigan’s dispensaries since
medical marijuana was legalized in Michigan in 2008. 77 Further, the restrictions imposed on
dispensaries that limited source from licensed growers yielded a subsequent shortage in
recreational cannabis once Michigan’s adult-use market went live in late 2019.78 Industry leaders
in Michigan pointed to the state’s decision to provide licenses to cannabis service providers, such
as transporters and testers, prior to licensing growers. 79 As a result, the cost of one pound of
cannabis in Michigan rose to over $4,000 per pound—nearly $3,000 more than the same pound
in Colorado at that time.80
Regulations also burdened California’s industry in 2018 when new testing regulations caused a
product testing backlog and shortage of legal cannabis. As of December 2018, California only
had fifty-seven testing laboratories available to test products from the 641 licensed retailers. 81
Based on these figures, it is not difficult to imagine why a testing backlog occurred after the
imposition of the new regulations. Not only did California experience a shortage of legal
cannabis, but the California Growers Association noted that nearly half of the state’s 50,000
cannabis cultivators (of which only 6,970 had been licensed in 2018) had been driven back to the
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illicit market, or never left it, due to overregulation.82 In addition to pushing cultivators back to
illicit trade and producing a licit cannabis shortage, California overregulation contributed to
increased prices on legal cannabis.
Increased regulation creates increased compliance costs for those who wish to obtain or
keep active licenses. Those costs must be borne by someone and are generally passed on to
consumers in the form of higher product prices. 83
In sum, overregulation of the legal cannabis industry has created access problems, a lack
of incentive for illicit businesses to join the legal market, and both supply shortages and
surpluses, resulting in products that never make their way into the consumer’s hands even if
purchased legally. This pattern of overregulation not only affects states that have legalized and
have an active legal cannabis market, such as Michigan and California, but also states that have
yet to fully realize an operational legal cannabis market, such as New Jersey. In attempting to
create fully fleshed out legal markets, legalization states are imposing regulatory frameworks
that are overly burdensome to all actors in the cannabis supply chain from cultivators to retailers.
Restrictions and regulations on the cultivation, testing, transportation, and sale of recreational
cannabis create production bubbles within these states, causing the opposite effect that
legalization statutes wish to achieve, namely bolstering—or even encouraging—sales via the
illicit cannabis market.
B. Barriers to Entry & Monopolistic Behavior
Existing regulatory restrictions on cannabis have created significant barriers to industry
entry, and consequently, less opportunity for competition in the field. Cannabis industry experts
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have noted that marijuana localism, or the cession of regulatory control over cannabis from state
agencies to local towns and municipalities, creates the biggest barrier to entry for new cannabis
businesses.84 Specifically, experts cite high levels of bureaucracy and red tape, significant capital
outlays, and lengthy timelines from application to open doors as the leading causes of
disincentivized new cannabis businesses.85 Noting the difficult and time-consuming application
process for licensure, high application fees, extremely short application windows, and high
minimum funding requirements, experts criticize the “pay-to-play” model that many states have
imposed on entry into their legal cannabis markets. 86 The money required to invest in licensing
and adhering to the overly burdensome regulatory frameworks keeps most would-be retailers
from entering the legal cannabis industry.87 As a result, some cannabis operators who were
fortunate enough to obtain more than one license subsequently sold those licenses to others
seeking to enter the legal cannabis market, using the proceeds from the license sales to fund their
operations.88
Another form of localism that creates a high barrier to market entry comes in the form of
license capping, or the practice of limiting the number of licenses available. The practice of
capping the total number of cannabis licenses available in a state or city tends to favor those with
connections and lobbying resources.89 For instance, Curaleaf, one of the largest cannabis
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companies by revenue in the United States, boasted in an annual report that it “maintains an
operational footprint of primarily limited-license states, with natural high barriers to entry and
limited market participants.”90 Green Thumb, another cannabis company in the same revenue
tier, laid out plans to become “oligopolistic” in seven state markets in 2018.91
Aside from license capping, there have been other instances where concern about
monopolistic behavior by cannabis companies and the creation of barriers to entry by state
legislatures have led to criticism from cannabis activists. Shaleen Title, vice-chair of the
Cannabis Regulators of Color Coalition, points to two specific examples of monopolistic
behavior in the cannabis industry. First, Title notes that consumers commonly complain that
cannabis businesses collude with one another to fix cannabis prices, citing a previously
threatened antitrust lawsuit against cannabis operators in the state of Washington. 92 Second, Title
points to a North Carolina medical marijuana bill that required businesses to have five years of
out-of-state experience, effectively disqualifying new or local entrants 93 Title also notes that
allowing a small number of dominant companies to own a particular market segment could lead
to potential public health concerns, drawing a parallel to the alcohol and tobacco industries. 94
To remedy the potential issues presented by localism, Title suggests allowing for
personal cannabis cultivation at home, prohibiting vertical integration (e.g., the control of
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multiple stages of the supply chain by a single entity), removing license caps, and incentivizing
market participation for small businesses.95 Personal cultivation would avoid requiring
consumers to only purchase recreational cannabis from commercial entities, leveling the power
imbalance that exists between the producer and the consumer. With respect to vertical
integration, Title explains that many states, including Washington, West Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Michigan have already imposed limitations on the quantity
and type of cannabis business licenses that one entity may possess. 96 The final two suggestions—
removing license caps and creating incentives for small businesses—would work in tandem with
each other, given that license caps generally create an overly competitive market for the licenses
and drive smaller would-be operators out of the running for market participation.
IV.

HOW TO FIX THE PROBLEM

A. Interstate Agreements
Proponents of widespread recreational cannabis legalization have contended that the
solution to the illicit drug market is legalization. Only through legalization, they argue, can
regulators ensure that the illicit market fails. By causing cannabis production to be hyperlocalized within state lines, however, responsible parties are all but guaranteeing the growth of
an illicit market for marijuana from other states, effectively rendering their legalization efforts
useless.
To combat the potential growth of an interstate illicit drug market, the Alliance for
Sensible Markets (ASM), a non-profit coalition of business and advocacy leaders who seek to
create a sustainable cannabis industry, have called for the proliferation of direct interstate
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agreements between legalization states. According to the ASM’s website, its goal is to petition
“governors of established producer states California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington to seek
guidance from the U.S. Department of Justice on the agency’s stance should two or more
medical or adult-use states decide to regulate commerce between themselves.” 97
Recently, the California legislature introduced SB-1326, which would amend the state’s
legalization statute, the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act
(MAUCRSA) by authorizing interstate cannabis sales, notwithstanding federal law. 98
Specifically, SB-1326 permits the Governor of California to enter into direct agreements with
other states authorizing interstate cannabis commerce for both medicinal and adult-use
commercial activities.99 The bill would also:
1) Limit interstate commercial cannabis activities to out-of-state
operators that secure a state license, or a local license, permit, or
other authorization issued by the local jurisdiction; 2) Require that
the other states impose requirements, including product safety,
labeling, and testing requirements, on their cannabis licensees that
meet or exceed the requirements applicable to MAUCRSA
licensees; and 3) Mandate that the agreement include provisions for
collection of applicable taxes.100
Of the requirements imposed by SB-1326, the second clause imposing one-to-one
requirements that mirror California’s MAUCRSA could face potential Dormant Commerce
Clause challenges should that provision be viewed as overly burdensome on out-of-state
operators. Potential challengers should not lose sight of the potentially positive consequences of
enacting such a bill, however, as it would arguably pave the way for other states to do the same
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and create a pseudo-national network that would allow the cannabis supply chain to grow
naturally through interstate commerce.
If enacted, SB-1326 would help address California’s oversupply problems by allowing
cannabis operators to export their surplus to retailers in other states.101 Opening up interstate
cannabis commerce through an agreement would also uniquely position California to be one of
the first states to take advantage of federal legalization since it would already have a system for
interstate exportation in place.102 The California bill is similar to SB-1042 in Oregon, which was
enacted in 2019. SB-1042 grants the Governor the power to enter into agreements with
neighboring states to regulate interstate cannabis commerce, but with the caveat that federal
legalization must happen first.103 California’s act is not contingent upon federal legality, so the
Governor of California arguably has significantly more leeway to enter into the agreements. If
enacted, SB-1326 would help to legitimize and promote interstate cannabis commerce, and, if
mirrored in other legalization states, could foster the natural growth of the cannabis supply chain
and its corresponding market without worrying about federal legalization.
B. A Novel Idea: The 2014 & 2018 Farm Bills
The federal Agricultural Act of 2014 did not amend the definition of “marijuana” under
the CSA. The statutory language included a provision which excluded the Act from the CSA’s
reach by stating that the bill’s provisions were enacted “notwithstanding the Controlled
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Substances Act . . . or any other Federal law.”104 In United States v. Mallory, the West Virginia
Southern District Court noted that, although the 2014 Act “did not amend the definition of
‘marijuana’ under the CSA, its use of the term ‘notwithstanding’ indicates Congress intended to
override any conflicting provisions in the CSA.”105 Based on that rationale, the inclusion of a
“notwithstanding” clause created a sort of loophole for Congress to avoid conflicts between two
statutes. Should Congress decide to enact legislation that would promote, or even permit,
cooperative interstate agreements, it could avoid conflict issues between such legislation and the
CSA by including a “notwithstanding” clause.
Further supporting this notion is the existence of cannabis-specific precedent in the
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (AIA), which expressly permitted the transport of hemp,
its seeds, and hemp-derived products across state lines.106 Hemp and cannabis are the same
species of plant.107 “Legally, hemp is defined as a cannabis plant that contains 0.3 percent or less
[tetrahydrocannabinol] (THC), while marijuana is a cannabis plant that contains more than 0.3
percent THC.”108 To avoid conflict between the AIA and the CSA, Congress amended the CSA
to specifically exclude THC in hemp from Schedule I classification and remove hemp from the
definition of “marijuana” under the CSA.109 While the main driver behind this congressional
action was likely the difference in concentration of the hallucinogenic THC in marijuana versus
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hemp, Congress’s actions with the AIA clearly prove that it has the capability of legislating
around the CSA without offending its provisions or purpose.
V.

BUMPS IN THE ROAD: POTENTIAL ROADBLOCKS TO FIXING THE PROBLEM
A. Federal Roadblocks
The federal government’s power to issue directives to the states to address a particular

problem or administer or enforce a federal regulatory program is limited by the Tenth
Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine.110 The Supreme Court has held that the Tenth
Amendment specifically prohibits the federal government “from imposing targeted, affirmative,
coercive duties upon state legislators or executive officials.” 111 In New York v. United States, the
Court recognized the anti-commandeering doctrine, stating that “Congress may not simply . . .
commandee[r] the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.”112
Imagine a world where the anti-commandeering doctrine did not exist. In this parallel
universe, Congress would be empowered to step into effect either positive or negative change as
it relates to state protectionism. Should potential Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state
statutes fail, Congress could pass legislation to specifically address the purportedly
discriminatory provisions in state legalization statutes that prohibit interstate commerce in
cannabis. This action could require states to cooperate with one another to facilitate the creation
of a pseudo-national cannabis industry, notwithstanding federal cannabis prohibition. Arguably,
such legislation could find support both under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, allowing
Congress to regulate activities which directly affect interstate commerce, as well as under the

110 U.S. C ONST . amend. X.
111 Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI ., 574

ANNALS 158 (2001).
112 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).

25

Dormant Commerce Clause, preventing states from enacting protectionist measures to the
detriment of non-residents. Conversely, in a negative view, Congress could enact legislation
which explicitly barred states from joining in cooperative interstate agreements for the
manufacture, transportation, and sale of recreational cannabis. Congressional regulation of the
cannabis industry has found judicial support in the past, so envisioning legislation to further
curtail interstate activity in cannabis is more realistic than one would believe. 113
Direct interstate agreements to regulate cannabis commerce could be further obstructed
by another, less notable part of the Constitution. Article I contains the Compact Clause. That
Clause provides that “[n]o State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”114 At first glance, the
Compact Clause seems at odds with the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine. The
Supreme Court, however, has held that congressional approval is only required when an
agreement “might affect injuriously” other state interests or when the compact would infringe on
the “rights of the national government.”115 The Court further ruled in Virginia v. Tennessee that
congressional consent is not required in instances concerning minor matters such as state
boundaries,116 recognizing that such matters would “have no tendency to increase the political
powers of the contracting states or to encroach upon the just supremacy of the United States.” 117
Depending on how an interstate agreement with respect to cannabis commerce would be graded,
the Compact Clause could either be a hindrance or not applicable.

113 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the Controlled Substances Act was a valid

exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
114 U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
115 Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2018) (quoting Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. 478, 494 (1855)).
116 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893).
117 U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 3.

26

B. Marijuana Localism
Most legalization states have ceded the power to decide if marijuana retailers can open in
any given community to towns and municipalities, creating a disjointed patchwork of
legalization and prohibition of retail cannabis businesses. For example, of New Jersey’s 565
towns and municipalities,118 only ninety-eight—or seventy percent—will allow cannabis
dispensaries to open for recreational use. 119 In most localities, voters have not had a direct say
about opting into or out of the recreational cannabis business as that decision is generally left to
local officials, like city councils. Although most opt-outs are a result of negative sentiment
toward recreational cannabis businesses, some municipalities enacted local-level bans on retail
recreational cannabis businesses simply to buy themselves more time to craft individualized
regulations befitting their area before giving the go-ahead to marijuana retailers.120
When recreational cannabis was legalized in Colorado in December 2012 and statelicensed retail sales began in January 2014, 165 municipalities voted to ban retail cannabis sales
while another fifty-three voted to permit them.121 Moreover, among the Colorado municipalities
that voted to permit retail cannabis sales, only half voted to levy local taxes on those sales. 122
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Municipalities diverge from one another even further regarding their respective requirements as
to the number, location, and size of retail cannabis stores.123
Professor Robert Mikos, outlining the “marijuana localism” theory (discussed in Part
IIIB, infra). In favor of localism, he argues that “localism theory suggests that more people
might be satisfied if their local government rather than the state (or national) government
controlled marijuana sales policy.”124 On the other hand, Mikos notes that marijuana localism
could potentially lead to two negative consequences: marijuana smuggling and marijuana
tourism.125 Mikos points out that local residents have a constitutional “right to travel and to take
advantage of the legal entitlements of neighboring jurisdictions.” 126 This right to travel
technically prohibits localities from barring its residents from buying marijuana somewhere else,
even if it bans marijuana within its own borders. 127 In so doing, these residents would be
achieving their original goal of obtaining cannabis while simultaneously rendering their home
locality’s prohibitions ineffective and pointless. Marijuana smuggling clearly has the potential to
undermine any policy objectives of retail-prohibitive communities.128
With respect to marijuana tourism, Mikos points out that individuals who travel from
their retail-prohibitive jurisdiction to a retail-permissive one to both buy and use cannabis create
potential costs for both the home and destination jurisdictions. 129 First, there is the inherent risk
posed by consuming marijuana, which contains the hallucinogenic THC, and the operation of a
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vehicle to return home.130 Second, Mikos notes the potential for a “crashing the party problem,”
proposing that marijuana destinations would not be able to control the tourists’ actions. 131
Building on this idea, Mikos explains that marijuana tourists, or “outsiders,” are more likely to
create problems than locals because:
(1) [T]heir connection to the local community is weaker, so
they feel less inhibited while there; (2) their lack of
familiarity with the local environment may make them more
prone to accidents; (3) they have to travel farther than
residents to consume marijuana, so they might drive longer
distances under the influence of marijuana; (4) they may be
more inclined to overindulge since they have limited access
back home; and (5) on average, tourists may be less
experienced with marijuana use and thus more susceptible
to—or simply less aware of—its psychoactive effects.132
Similarly, California saw an increase in illicit market sales in response to the creation of
access problems resulting from local overregulation of cannabis. California’s state legislature
ceded the power to ban cannabis retailers and dispensaries to localities, similar to New Jersey.
As a result, many Californians seized upon cannabis “NIMBYism,” or the desire to have a
particular result “not in my backyard.” In a July 2018 study, researchers found that one-in-five
Californians over the age of twenty-one had purchased cannabis from unlicensed sellers, and a
further eighty-four percent of those consumers said they were highly likely to continue to
purchase from the illicit market, citing lower prices and no taxation. 133 The study concluded that
California’s recreational cannabis market was plagued by three distinct issues: 1) undersaturation of legal marijuana retailers due to local overregulation; 2) additional access problems
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due to state overregulation; and 3) overregulation at both the state and local levels creating high
prices and taxes, rendering legal cannabis unaffordable. 134
Opponents of marijuana localism argue that local-level restrictions on retail cannabis
operations lead to social inequity and the potential for abuse of local zoning powers. 135
Professors William Bunting and James Lammendola posit that inequity occurs when localities
that ban retail cannabis sales benefit from state sales tax revenues that are generated by cannabis
operations in permissive localities, creating a “free-rider” problem.136 The free-rider problem is
common in the context of public goods, or goods with non-excludable benefits.137 For example,
more state tax revenue from retail cannabis sales benefits everyone within the state, even those
localities that have banned retail cannabis sales. Bunting and Lammendola further note that
although two out of three Americans support recreational cannabis legalization, 138 nearly half of
Americans oppose having cannabis dispensaries in their neighborhood. 139 As a result, those who
reside in localities that have banned or meaningfully restricted cannabis receive the benefits of
legalization without incurring any of the corresponding social costs (should they exist).140
In sum, marijuana localism could potentially undermine any solutions that allow for
interstate commerce in cannabis. It appears that state governments appreciate that our federalist
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system allows them to decide for themselves to legalize cannabis and are extending that same
ideology to the local level. However, state delegation of power to authorize or prohibit retail
cannabis to their respective localities could potentially create more harm than benefit. In closing
their borders to retail cannabis, local communities create an environment primed for marijuana
smuggling and marijuana tourism, which individually and collectively obviate the need for local
approval powers in the first place.
C. Lack of Incentive to Change State Laws
Economic protectionism is the most generally accepted reason why states lack the
incentive to change their restrictive regulatory regimes on cannabis. 141 By banning interstate
activities associated with cannabis, states have all but ensured that their respective local cannabis
industries are shielded from any potential out-of-state competition. Legalization states are likely
worried that, if they open their borders to interstate cannabis activities, the economic benefits
associated with creating a cannabis supply chain silo within the state would face the risk of
reduction or outright disappearance. In fact, in its push to persuade voters to legalize marijuana,
states such as South Dakota informed voters through marketing materials that “[a]ll marijuana
sold in South Dakota must be grown and packaged inside our borders, which will lead to
hundreds of jobs for construction workers, plumbers, electricians . . . .” 142 By framing their
regulatory regimes as achieving economic protectionism goals, states ensure that voters are
none-the-wiser to the potential negative consequences of sealing their borders to interstate
cannabis commerce.
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Legalization states also may worry that, if they engage in interstate cannabis commerce
through direct agreements, their respective marijuana tourism industries may suffer. As
previously explained, marijuana tourism occurs when a resident of one jurisdiction travels to
another for the purpose of buying and consuming cannabis. In today’s intrastate-only cannabis
economy, a resident of State A must physically travel to State B to obtain his or her favorite
strain or edible that may not be produced in State A, either due to varying growing environments,
availability of raw materials, or lack of a market for the product in State A. Should the states
enter into direct state agreements and decide to regulate interstate commerce in cannabis
amongst themselves, the need to physically travel between states could be rendered unnecessary.
It is generally accepted that the advent of eCommerce, or online shopping, has taken a
large portion of the retail market share away from brick-and-mortar stores.143 Kids of the 1990s
will remember the excitement of a family trip to the local Blockbuster store to rent the latest
VHS release—an activity rendered obsolete with the invention of online streaming. It is
reasonable to believe that, if states choose to engage in interstate cannabis commerce, it would
open the (non-literal) doors to online cannabis commerce, allowing a resident in State A to
purchase their favorite strain or edible from State B via the Internet, obviating the need to travel.
States could potentially be wary of the loss of marijuana-adjacent additional revenues they might
have enjoyed had the State A resident physically traveled to State B, from activities like hotel
stays, sightseeing, and dining out in State B.
Despite the incentives for states to retain their existing intrastate frameworks, it would be
irresponsible for them to ignore potential legal challenges rooted in the Dormant Commerce
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Clause. As explained above, Maine recently lost a case, which was based on a challenge to
Maine’s cannabis legalization statute requiring licensees to be Maine residents, where the court
deemed the requirement unconstitutional under the DCC. 144 It is not unlikely that states could
face similar challenges to their intrastate cannabis frameworks on the presumption that the DCC
expressly prohibits State A from discriminating against residents of State B in interstate
commerce. Therefore, states should consider the potential legal ramifications of such a challenge
to their legalization statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the legal cannabis industry is one of the most exciting and fresh in today’s
economy, the industry faces many roadblocks to its natural growth from local to national scale.
Due to its unique nature of being federally prohibited but legalized on a state level, cannabis falls
in a legal gray area that has led to a lack of regulatory uniformity from state-to-state. Numerous
factors, including state-authorized prohibitions on interstate commerce, cession of regulatory
oversight from state to local governments, and significant barriers to entry into the recreational
cannabis industry have created supply chain disruptions that range from lack of ample suppliers
or cultivators, under/oversupply of product, and the bolstering of the illicit cannabis market.
While large operators in the cannabis industry can take on the significant costs and navigate the
complicated application process that comes along with entering the market, small businesses are
left at a disadvantage, yielding potentially monopolistic consequences.
Although federal legalization would resolve many of these issues, the possibility still
seems years away. Given that states are vested with the power to legalize and regulate
recreational cannabis intrastate, it stands to reason that the states have the power to regulate
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interstate cannabis commerce as well. Legalization states have demonstrated that they clearly
recognize their respective capabilities to circumvent federal law as it relates to cannabis
legalization, so they should have no issue opening the cannabis trade to facilitate interstate
cannabis commerce. Without expansion, an industry either becomes stagnant or disappears. The
advent of eCommerce pushed traditional brick-and-mortar retailers to modernize their supply
chains, opening a new revenue stream and allowing each to stay in business. eCommerce, by
definition, has allowed retailers to sell beyond their borders, leading to the natural growth of a
business. The cannabis industry faces a long and arduous road to self-sustainability if no action is
taken to curtail the issues plaguing its supply chain.
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